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Impulsivity is a feature of many brain disorders. Although often deﬁned as the predisposi-
tion to act with an inadequate degree of deliberation, forethought, or control, it has proven
difﬁcult to measure. This may in part be due to the fact that it is a multifaceted construct,
with impulsive decisions potentially arising as a result of a number of underlying mecha-
nisms. Indeed, a “functional” degree of impulsivity may even promote effective behavior
in healthy participants in a way that can be advantageous under certain circumstances.
Although many tasks have been developed to study impulsivity, few examine decisions
made rapidly, for time-sensitive rewards. In the current study we examine behavior in 59
adults on a manual “Trafﬁc Light” task which requires participants to take risks under time
pressure, if they are to maximize reward. We show that behavioral variables that index
rapid anticipatory responding in this paradigm are correlated with one, speciﬁc self-report
measure of impulsivity: “lack of premeditation” on the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale. Par-
ticipants who scored more highly on this subscale performed better on the task. Moreover,
anticipatory behavior reduced signiﬁcantly with age (18–79 years), an effect that continued
to be upheld after correction for potential age differences in the ability to judge the tim-
ing of responses. Based on these ﬁndings, we argue that the Trafﬁc Light task provides a
parametric method to study one aspect of impulsivity in health and disease: namely, rapid
decision-making in pursuit of risky, time-sensitive rewards.
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INTRODUCTION
Impulsivity has been deﬁned as the predisposition to act with a
low or inadequate degree of deliberation, forethought, or control
(Moeller et al., 2001). It is clear, however, that the term means dif-
ferent things to different researchers. Operationally, impulsivity
is considered to be a multidimensional construct, with impulsive
behavior potentially arising from several different mechanisms,
underpinned by distinct neural, and cognitive systems (Evenden,
1999; Gray, 2000;Whiteside and Lynam, 2001; Dalley et al., 2011).
An established self-report instrument, the UPPS Impulsive
Behavior Scale (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001), for example, dis-
tinguishes four cognitive dimensions that predispose to impulsive
acts: (1) lack of premeditation or a tendency to act without delib-
eration; (2) lack of perseverance or inability to complete dull or
difﬁcult tasks; (3) urgency or acting rashly whilst upset; and (4)
sensation-seeking or need for novelty and excitement. These four
factors relate differentially to distinct psychiatric disorders charac-
terized by impulsive behavior (Whiteside et al., 2005; Miller et al.,
2009), as well as to the risk of engaging in impulsive acts (Klonsky
and May, 2010).
Although impulsivity is often used to refer to a dysfunctional
state, it has been argued that an impulsive style of responding does
not alwayshavenegative consequences. Indeed, if the taskdemands
are relatively simple but participants are under time pressure, peo-
ple classiﬁed as being highly impulsive can sometimes perform
better than those with low trait impulsivity (Dickman and Meyer,
1988). Such observations ledDickman to propose that theremight
be two general classes of impulsivity: “dysfunctional” and “func-
tional”(Dickman,1990). The former is considered to be associated
with classical views of impulsivity: lack of forethought when delib-
eration would be better. By contrast, functional impulsivity refers
to the tendency to act rapidly with little forethought when this style
of responding might be optimal.
Dickman showed these two tendencies are not correlated across
individuals, and they have different cognitive correlates. Thus,
while high “functionally impulsive” individuals were faster and
more accurate to complete a rapid task requiring basic perceptual
judgments compared to low “functionally impulsive” individu-
als, there was no such distinction between individuals with high
and low dysfunctional traits (Dickman, 1990). Thus “functional
impulsivity” can be advantageous under certain circumstances.
Conversely, recent experimental data has revealed that “dysfunc-
tional impulsivity” correlates (inversely) with the ability to inhibit
actions indexed by the STOP signal reaction time task, but “func-
tional impulsivity” measures do not (Colzato et al., 2010). These
considerations might be important for the development of new
experimental tools to measure impulsive traits.
In addition to self-report instruments such as theUPPS (White-
side and Lynam, 2001) or the longer-established Barratt Impul-
siveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995), several experimental
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cognitive tasks have been used to measure impulsive decision-
making. These include delay discounting (Kirby and Herrnstein,
1995; Pine et al., 2010), probabilistic gambling (Bechara et al.,
1994), and information sampling tasks (Clark et al., 2006). How-
ever, in none of these tasks are participants compelled to respond
rapidly. In fact, on such tasks swift“impulsive”decisions are always
suboptimal.
The only widely used task that does require rapid responses
is the Stop Signal task (Logan et al., 1997), deployed to mea-
sure inhibitory control. In that paradigm, responses need to be
made rapidly in response to an imperative cue. In real life, how-
ever, decisions are sometimes made quickly in the absence of a
direct, external signal instructing us to do so. For example, when
cycling in a highly congested city, negotiating between trafﬁc and
pedestrians, we often have tomake rapid decisions without overtly
being instructed to do so. Similarly, inmanymodern gaming envi-
ronments, people do not have time to ponder over the possible
choices.
Under such circumstances prolonged, careful deliberation
might seem to be “safe and sure” but it can also be detrimental
to the overall result, or lead to missed opportunities. Therefore, to
address these issues, we developed a manual version of a “Trafﬁc
Light” paradigm that measures rapid decision-making in pursuit
of time-sensitive, risky rewards. Our aim was to produce a task
that captures the range of functional impulsivity in healthy people
and is also capable of tracking its change with aging, as well as in
pathological states.
On each trial in the Trafﬁc Light paradigm, participants view a
red light that successively turns amber, then green. Participants are
instructed to respond rapidly following the onset of the green“go”
signal, in order to obtain reward; responding prior to green incurs
a small, ﬁxed penalty. Reward value declines precipitously with
increasing reaction time from green onset, so participants should
aim tomake responses with theminimum possible latency follow-
ing green onset. However, the duration of amber is variable so the
temporal onset of green cannot be conﬁdently predicted. More-
over, because human sensorimotor decision-making is subject to
substantial delays (simple motor decisions take around 200ms to
initiate in response to a go signal; Reddi and Carpenter, 2000; Tay-
lor et al., 2006), participants cannot attain the highest rewards if
they merely wait, and respond reactively to green onset.
Instead, as time unfolds during the amber foreperiod, partici-
pantsmust decide whether to continue towait, or to take a risk and
initiate in advance an anticipatory response. Such“risky”decisions
can lead to responses being executed just prior to the green light
(in which case they will be penalized) or just after it (in which
case they will be highly rewarded). Thus, to do well in this par-
adigm, participants have to demonstrate a degree of “functional
impulsivity” and be prepared to make some risky, anticipatory
responses.
We evaluated evidence for impulsive, opportunistic responding
in our paradigm by measuring the frequency of penalized tri-
als (responses made prior to green onset) and the overall reward
obtained, and we also applied a probabilistic model to character-
ize decision-making behavior. Using these variables we were able
to investigate whether there is a relationship between anticipatory
behavior in the Trafﬁc Light task and self-reported impulsivity,
as well as changes with aging since healthy aging is associated
with reduced risk-taking and increased cautiousness (Deakin et al.,
2004; Dohmen et al., 2005).
It could be argued that good performance on this task relates
simply to howwell people judge time. Successful early, anticipatory
responses before the green light might rely solely upon the ability
to perceive the passage of time, and to judge whether the current
duration of amber is longer, or shorter than average. Therefore, we
also administered a control task which measures time judgment,
or more formally temporal duration discrimination (Bueti et al.,
2008). We predicted that performance on this task would con-
tribute to, but not entirely account for individual differences in
Trafﬁc Light behavior. Finally, we administered Raven’s Advanced
Progressive Matrices (APM) and a demographical questionnaire
as control measures, to evaluate the extent to which younger and
older participants in our cross-sectional sample could be said to
arise from similar underlying populations.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The sample consisted of 59 participants (31 female) aged 18.5–
79.1 years (mean 34.2 years, SD 15.0) recruited from the local
participant database. Detailed participant information is avail-
able on request. Participants gave informed consent according to
the Declaration of Helsinki. The study was approved by the local
ethics committee.
MEASURES
Participants completed the following measures:
• Trafﬁc Light task.
• Temporal duration discrimination task.
• UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001).
• BIS-11 (Patton et al., 1995).
• Raven’s 12-item APM (Raven, 2000).
• Demographical, lifestyle, and psychiatric questionnaire.
The protocol was as follows. Participants completed a practice
task, followed by three blocks of the Trafﬁc Light task, the BIS-
11, three additional blocks of the Trafﬁc Light task, the UPPS,
temporal duration discrimination task, Raven’s 12-APM and the
demographical questionnaire. The duration of testing was 90min
per participant. A small number of participants did not com-
plete the full battery. Participants were paid £7 per hour for
their time.
Individual measures, and their respective methods of analysis,
are described in detail below.We identiﬁed outliers >2.5 SD from
themean of eachmeasure. One participant was an outlier onmul-
tiple measures (time bias, self-reported impulsivity and measures
of response time), and therefore we excluded this dataset in its
entirety. After this dataset was excluded, the following individually
outlying data points were excluded: one high and one low outlier
on time bias/bias magnitude, one high outlier on a measure of
post-error slowing and one low outlier on BIS total score. For lin-
ear analyses of age we conservatively excluded two high outliers on
age. Statistical signiﬁcancewas p< 0.05 unless otherwise speciﬁed.
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Trafﬁc light task
The Trafﬁc Light task assesses rapid, opportunistic decision-
making in pursuit of risky, time-sensitive rewards. Participants
decide when to execute a response based on when they expect the
analog of a trafﬁc light to change from amber to green.
On each trial participants view a red light which turns amber,
then green (Figure 1). The duration of the amber trafﬁc light is
drawn at random on each trial from a Gaussian distribution with
mean 750ms and SD 125ms, and is therefore (boundedly) unpre-
dictable. However, reward value per trial declines very steeply with
increasing reaction time (RT) from green onset,whereas responses
occurring prior to green incur only a small, ﬁxed penalty. Partici-
pants must decide whether to prepare in advance an anticipatory
response, based on when they expect the green light to appear
(which could result in a high reward, but risks a penalty), or to
wait for the green light and then respond reactively (resulting in a
small, certain reward).
Participants are rewarded with hypothetical money for making
a manual response to a white target cross to the left or right of
the screen, using a Cedrus RB-830 response pad (Cedrus Corpo-
ration, 2010). The target alternates predictably from left to right
across trials, as indicated by the green“go” arrow. Responses to the
leftward target are made with the index ﬁnger of the left hand, and
responses to the rightward target are made with the index ﬁnger
of the right hand. RT data are used to provide real-time reward
feedback on each trial.
Reward per trial is calculated according to an inverse exponen-
tial temporal discount function: for a reaction time greater than
zero ms, with respect to green onset
R = 150
e(RT/100)
where R is reward value per trial (pence) and RT is reaction time
with respect to the onset of green. Thus, disproportionately high
rewards are obtained for extremely rapid responses:ARTof 300ms
generates £0.075, 200ms yields £0.20, 100ms yields £0.55, and
0ms results in £1.50. Responses occurring prior to green onset are
subject to a ﬁxed penalty of £0.10 (10 p).
Feedback is given both visually and aurally. On each trial, par-
ticipants are shown the amount they have won on the current
trial, as well as a running total. Trial reward values between £0.01
and 0.20 are accompanied by a “ping” sound whereas trial reward
values greater than £0.20 are accompanied by a more reward-
ing “ker-ching” cash-register sound. Penalized early responses are
accompanied by low-pitched beep sound. Prior to performing the
task, participants were given full and veridical instructions via a
standardized demo.
Each block of the Trafﬁc Light task consists of 50 trials. In order
to maintain motivation, participants are encouraged to pay atten-
tion to their total winnings in each block, and on the next block to
try and “beat their record.”
Analysis of trafﬁc light data. For each participant we calcu-
lated the percentage of penalized trials, mean reward per block
and mean reward per rewarded trial. These were interrogated for
FIGURE 1 |Traffic LightTask. On each trial a trafﬁc light signal turns
successively red, then amber, then green. Amber duration (x ms) varies
randomly, whereas reward per trial is a function of how rapidly a response is
made in relation to the onset of green (RT ms). Responses made subsequent
to the onset of green onset are rewarded (left stream) whereas responses
made prior to the onset of the green light are penalized (right stream).
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hypothesized effects of self-reported impulsivity, age and tempo-
ral duration discrimination, using regression and partial correla-
tion as appropriate. For effects across blocks, which could reﬂect
learning,we used repeatedmeasuresANOVA (within-subjects fac-
tor: block), entering self-reported impulsivity, age, and temporal
duration discrimination variables as covariates.
Next, we applied a two-horse linear rise-to-threshold model
to RT distributions from the Trafﬁc Light task (Adam et al.,
2011). This method probabilistically assigns trial RTs to popu-
lations elicited from an anticipatory vs. reactive decision process
(Reddi and Carpenter, 2000). In our model, these processes com-
pete in a “two-horse race” toward the threshold for triggering
a response (see Figure 2). In this model, Trafﬁc Light response
distributions are described as the product of two linear rise-to-
threshold decision processes which “race” to trigger a response.
The ﬁrst, anticipatory decision process is evoked prior to green
onset, and rises slowly to threshold from amber onset (with mean
rate of rise μa and SD σa). The second, reactive decision process
is triggered by the onset of green, and rises sharply to response
initiation threshold (with mean rate of rise μr and SD σr).
To implement our model, we assumed that the distribution of
anticipatory responses (amber distribution, Figure 2) could be
described as the product of a rise-to-threshold process triggered
by amber onset (at time t= 0), and that the distribution of reactive
responses (green distribution, Figure 2) could be described as the
product of a rise-to-threshold process triggered by green onset (at
time t 0, on average 750ms after amber onset). Hence, the prob-
ability that a response had occurred by time t following amber
onset (i.e., the cumulative probability distribution) was given by:
Pr(T ≤ t ) = ψA(t ) + ψR(t − t0) − ψA(t )ψR(t − t0)
ΨA and ΨR indicate cumulative recinormal distributions describ-
ing anticipatory and reactive processes, respectively (Reddi and
FIGURE 2 |Two-horse linear rise-to-threshold model of response time
data in theTraffic Light task. Group and individual response time data
were ﬁt to a two-horse linear rise-to-threshold model. Response time
distributions arise probabilistically from one of two linear rise-to-threshold
processes, and the ﬁrst process to reach the threshold (horizontal line) on a
given trial will trigger a response: (1) An anticipatory decision process,
triggered by the onset of the amber Trafﬁc Light, with mean rate of rise μa
and SD rate of rise σa. This process has a small mean rate of rise and large
variance, and therefore results in a wide distribution of RTs, of which some
are elicited prior to green. (2) A reactive decision process, triggered by the
onset of the greenTrafﬁc Light, with mean rate of rise μr and SD rate of rise
σr . This process has a high mean rate of rise and small variance, and
therefore results in a narrow distribution of RTs with median shortly after
green onset.
Carpenter, 2000). The mean μ and variance σ2 of each distrib-
ution can be interpreted as describing how rapidly and variably,
on average, each of the two decision processes rises toward the
threshold for initiating a response, and the multiplicative inverse
of the mean rate of rise is equal to the median of the resultant
anticipatory or reactive RT distribution. We assumed constant
response initiation threshold (horizontal line,Figure 2) and ﬁt the
four parameters to individual participant RT distributions using
maximum likelihood estimation (i.e., fminsearch in Matlab).
Model parameters were interrogated for hypothesized effects
of self-reported impulsivity, age, and temporal duration discrim-
ination1. Of central interest was whether there is a relationship
between anticipatory behavior in the Trafﬁc Light task, and self-
reported impulsivity. We predicted an association between Trafﬁc
Light anticipation variables (penalized trials; anticipatory rate of
rise μa) and lack of premeditation subscale on the UPPS, since
this subscale encapsulates the tendency to act rapidly, without
deliberation.
Furthermore, we reasoned that if anticipatory Trafﬁc Light
behavior reﬂects “functional impulsivity” (Dickman, 1990), then
self-reported impulsivity in healthy controls should be associ-
ated with higher mean reward and with well-judged anticipations
(and higher mean reward), rather than simple pre-emptiveness
or “jumping the gun.” We investigated whether the relationship
between the frequency of penalized trials and self-reported impul-
sivity was more pronounced on penalized trials for which amber
duration was longer (≥750ms) vs. shorter (<750ms) than aver-
age. A task-optimal, opportunistic strategy should entail selective
anticipation only on longer than average amber durations.
We reasoned that the degree to which participants adapt their
responses following a penalty might yield a partially independent
measure of their level of cautiousness. Post-error/penalty slowing
is often used as a measure of such adaptive control (Botvinick
et al., 2001). The magnitude of post-penalty slowing was interro-
gated for effects of self-reported impulsivity, age, and overall task
performance (reward).
Finally, we were interested to examine the effects of age on
behavior. Healthy aging is associated with reduced risk-taking,
and an increase in cautiousness (Deakin et al., 2004; Dohmen
et al., 2005). Therefore, if the Trafﬁc Light task indexes impul-
sive, opportunistic responding, anticipatory behavior (penalized
responses, anticipatory rate of rise μa) would be hypothesized to
reduce with age. However, if the effects of age on Trafﬁc Light per-
formance are simply due to cognitive or sensorimotor slowing, we
should instead observe a relationship with reactive model para-
meters (reactive rate of rise μr). Since model parameters were not
Normally distributed across participants, we used Kendall’s tau.
Temporal duration discrimination task
It is important to investigate to what extent performance on the
Trafﬁc Light task relates simply to the discrimination of time dura-
tions. We used a two-alternative forced choice temporal duration
discrimination task adapted from Bueti et al. (2008), task B. Time
1Note that we did not investigate model parameters for effects across the session, for
example an increase in anticipatory rate-of-rise between the ﬁrst and second three
blocks, since 150 trials is not sufﬁcient for model ﬁtting.
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durations were selected to assess sensitivity to trial-to-trial differ-
ences in amber duration that occur within the Trafﬁc Light task.
This enabled us to control for the potential impact of age and
individual differences in time perception on the frequency of fast,
“anticipatory” Trafﬁc Light responses.
Stimuli were green circles presented sequentially on a gray
screen. Each trial required a judgment as to which of the two
circles was presented for longer. On each trial, one of the two cir-
cle durations was 750ms (the “standard” duration), equivalent to
the mean duration of amber on the Trafﬁc Light task. The other
circle duration was a “comparison” duration drawn from a set of
eight durations, four of which were longer and four shorter than
the standard. The difference between standard and comparison
durations on each trial was ±50, ±100, ±150, or ±300ms. That
is, four out of eight comparison durations differed from the stan-
dard duration by <1 SD amber, and the other four differed by >1
SD amber.
The order of standard/comparison duration was fully ran-
domized across trials, and the eight comparison durations were
randomly ordered between trials. Participants used the index and
middle ﬁngers of the dominant hand on a computer keyboard to
indicate whether the ﬁrst or second duration was longer. Feed-
back was provided on each trial. Participants completed four
continuous blocks of the task consisting of 48 trials per block.
Raw data from the temporal duration discrimination task con-
sisted of the frequency of standard> comparison perceptual deci-
sions at each standard minus comparison interval (psychometric
curves). Individual participant psychometric curves were ﬁtted to
a cumulative Gaussian function with parameters bias, b, and vari-
ance, σ2 using standard psychophysical procedures implemented
in Matlab, and used to calculate the maximum slope of the psy-
chometric function. We used the slope and the mean perceptual
bias magnitude in group summary and inferential statistics (i.e.,
correlation between slope/bias and Trafﬁc Light reward, penalties
and μa).
UPPS, BIS-11, Raven’s 12-APM, and demographical questionnaire
Two established self-report measures of impulsivity, the UPPS
Impulsive Behavior Scale (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001) and the
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995), were
administered.We hypothesized that the lack of premeditation sub-
scale of the UPPS would predict anticipatory behavior on the
Trafﬁc Light task (penalized responses, modeled anticipatory rate
of rise μa).
All BIS-11 subscales load onto UPPS lack of premeditation,
with the strongest factor loading for BIS-11 motor impulsivity
(Whiteside and Lynam, 2001). Therefore, to explore convergent
validity, we investigated the relationship between Trafﬁc Light
anticipation variables and BIS-11 motor impulsivity (Whiteside
and Lynam, 2001).
Raven’s 12-APM and the demographical questionnaire were
used to evaluate the extent to which younger and older partici-
pants in our cross-sectional sample could be said to arise from
similar underlying populations. Thus, we checked whether the
correlation between age and Raven score in our sample was com-
parable with correlation coefﬁcients reported in previous studies
(e.g., Babcock, 1994, r ≈ 0.4); age effects on demographic variables
were investigated to gauge deviance from typical lifespan and pop-
ulation trends. We checked for any differences in employment,
computer use, and psychiatric illness which could limit general-
izability of our ﬁndings. The results were satisfactory. Data are
available on request.
RESULTS
TRAFFIC LIGHT PERFORMANCE
Performance varied considerably between individuals (see
Table 1). Overall, 14.3% of trials were penalized early trials (in
which responses occurred prior to green onset) but the range
across individuals varied widely from 0 to 34.6%. Similarly, overall
group mean reward per block was £11.58, but the range was large,
varyingbetween£3.32 and£16.84. The corresponding groupmean
reward per rewarded trial was 28 p, with range 7–47 p. This vari-
ability is important because we wanted to develop a task that has
a wide dynamic range across the population.
A second key motivation for developing this paradigm was
to produce a task in which making a decision to go early could
be functionally advantageous, even though it might sometimes
lead to penalties. By contrast, simply waiting for a cue to respond
(green light) would be “safe” (incurring no penalties) but lead
to small cumulative earnings overall. Importantly, we found that
participants who incurred more penalties on the Trafﬁc Light task
accumulated higher mean reward (r2adj = 0.234, p< 0.001). Thus,
making early responseswas functionally advantageous on this task.
Effects across blocks, which could reﬂect learning, were inves-
tigated using repeated measures ANOVA. These are discussed in
full in a separate Section “Learning Effects.”
MODELING PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF ANTICIPATORY AND
REACTIVE PROCESSES
We ﬁrst ﬁt our double recinormal model (Figure 2) to pooled
group Trafﬁc Light RT data (Figure 3). This suggested RTs fol-
lowed a bimodal distribution, and were satisfactorily described as
resulting from the combination of two decision processes:
1. An anticipatory linear rise-to-threshold decision process trig-
gered by amber light onset (with mean rate of rise μa 0.725
“decision signal” units per second and SD σa 0.618 s−1)
2. A reactive linear rise-to-threshold decision process triggered by
green light onset (with mean rate of rise μr of 4.52 “decision
signal” units per second and SD σr 1.27 s−1).
The multiplicative inverse of the mean rate of rise is equal to
the median of the resultant recinormal RT distribution:
• for the anticipatory decision process, this was 1380ms following
amber onset, and
• for the reactive decision process, this was 221ms following
green onset (corresponding well to previous estimates of simple
reactive RT; Reddi and Carpenter, 2000; Taylor et al., 2006).
The model reproduced the sensitivity of RT to the duration
of amber (Figure 4, compare left data panels with right model
results). Thus with increasing durations of amber, a greater num-
ber of “anticipatory” responses are elicited, leading to an increased
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Table 1 |Task variable descriptives and inter-relationships.
Measure Variable type Variable Group mean
(SD) or
median
Range Effect of
UPPS
premed
Effect of
BIS motor
Effect
of age
Effect of
time slope
Trafﬁc Light
Task
Simple
performance
variables
Penalized trials 14.3 (8.1)% 0–34.6% p=0.003 p=0.003 p=0.050 p>0.9
Mean
reward/block
£11.58 (3.10) £3.32–£16.84 p=0.013 p=0.014 p=0.011 p=0.037
Mean
reward/rewarded
trial
28 (9) p 7–47 p p=0.003 p=0.003 p=0.015
Two-horse
model
parameters
Anticipatory rate
of rise: μa
0.777 s−1 <0.01–
1.18 s−1
p=0.010 p=0.006 p=0.005 p>0.2
Reactive rate of
rise: μr
4.40 s−1 3.28–5.68 s−1 p>0.4 p>0.6 p>0.1
Penalty trials Poorly judged
penalized trials
(amber <750ms)
3.8 (3.5)% 0–14.6% p>0.05 p>0.1
Well-judged
penalized trials
(amber >750ms)
11.7 (3.1)% 3.32–16.8% p<0.001 p<0.001
Post-penalty
slowing
RT difference:
Post-penalty vs.
non-post-penalty,
non-penalty trials
86.6
(78.4)ms
−18–261ms p=0.017
Learning
effects across
blocks
Improvement in
mean
reward/block
across blocks
N.S. p=0.031
quadratic
N.S.
UPPS
Impulsive
Behavior Scale
Self-reported
impulsivity
Lack of
premeditation
(possible range:
1–4)
2 (0.5) 1–3 - p>0.7
Barratt
Impulsiveness
Scale
Motor impulsivity
(possible range:
11–44)
23 (4.2) 14–35 -
Temporal
duration
discrimination
task
Temporal
duration
discrimination
Slope 0.0018
(0.00078)
ms-1
0.0004–
0.0037ms-1
N.S. N.S. p>0.3 –
Blank cells indicate non-hypothesized and/or untested relationship.
likelihoodof penalized,aswell as highly rewarded trials,depending
on the duration of amber.
For hypothesis testing, we next ﬁtted our model to individual
participant RT distributions (see Table 1). The anticipatory rate
of rise varied substantially between individuals (see range values
in Table 1), exerting a minimal contribution to task behavior in
some participants and a substantial contribution in others. This
ﬁnding mirrors the fact that across individuals there was wide
variation in the propensity to make anticipations. By contrast, the
reactive decision process was relatively less variable both within
and between participants.
Importantly, likelihood ratio tests showed that the two-horse
linear rise-to-threshold model ﬁt single-participant data better
than a one-horse model with a single “reactive” cumulative reci-
normal distribution in all 43 datasets for which a one-horse
solution could be found (minimum χ2 value 16.6, p< 0.001).
RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-REPORTED IMPULSIVITY
If anticipatory Trafﬁc Light behavior reﬂects “functional impul-
sivity” (Dickman, 1990), then self-reported impulsivity should
be associated with well-judged anticipations (and higher mean
reward), rather than simple pre-emptiveness or“jumping the gun.”
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FIGURE 3 | Response time distribution in theTraffic Light task (N =58).
RT data, pooled across participants, shown with respect to green onset at
t=0.
Our analysis revealed signiﬁcant relationships between scores on
one sub-section of theUPPS and two variables on the Trafﬁc Light
task that can be considered to index anticipation. Speciﬁcally, there
were signiﬁcant correlations between UPPS lack of premeditation
scores and:
• penalized trials (r2adj = 0.157, p= 0.003).
• mean anticipatory rate of rise, μa (τ= 0.264, p= 0.010).
Moreover, there were also signiﬁcant correlations between
UPPS lack of premeditation scores and:
• mean reward per block (r2adj = 0.157, p= 0.013).
• mean reward per rewarded trial (r2adj = 0.154, p= 0.003).
Thus, not only did UPPS lack of premeditation scores pre-
dict anticipatory behavior, they also predicted overall outcome.
The more impulsive an individual was on this subscale of the
UPPS, the more functionally advantageous they were on the
Trafﬁc Light task. Importantly, mean rate of rise, μr of the mod-
eled reactive decision process showed no association with UPPS
lack of premeditation (p> 0.4). Furthermore, these correlations
were not observed for the remaining UPPS subscales (p> 0.1
for all).
To evaluate convergent validity, we also examined the pattern
of association between BIS-11 motor impulsivity and the afore-
mentioned Trafﬁc Light variables (penalized trials, reward, μa).
This showed a similar pattern: BIS-11 motor impulsivity was
signiﬁcantly associated with penalties (r2adj = 0.138, p= 0.003),
mean reward per block (r2adj = 0.090, p= 0.014), mean reward
per rewarded trial (r2adj = 0.133, p= 0.003), and anticipatory
mean rate of rise μa (τ= 0.262, p= 0.006). Again, there was no
association with reactive mean rate of riseμr (p> 0.6).
Next, we investigated whether the relationship between the fre-
quency of penalized trials and self-reported impulsivity was more
pronounced on penalized trials for which amber duration was
longer (≥750ms) vs. shorter (<750ms) than average. We pre-
dicted that a task-optimal, opportunistic strategy should entail
selective anticipation only on longer than average amber dura-
tions. This prediction was upheld: UPPS lack of premeditation
predicted the percentage of penalties incurred on long amber
durations (r2adj = 0.179, p< 0.001) but not on short amber dura-
tions (p> 0.05) on the Trafﬁc Light task. Similarly, BIS-11 motor
impulsivity predicted the percentage of penalties incurred on long
(r2adj = 0.169, p< 0.001) but not short amber durations (p> 0.1).
These results suggest that self-reported non-premeditative impul-
sivity is signiﬁcantly associated with the tendency to commit
“functionally impulsive” anticipatory responses on the Trafﬁc
Light task.
POST-PENALTY SLOWING
The degree to which people adapt their responses following an
error or penalty is often used as an index of adaptive control.
Here, we calculated this in two ways:
• difference in RT between post-penalty trials and all other trials,
and
• difference in RT between post-penalty trials and all other trials
except penalty trials (since penalized RTs might be faster than
average).
Participants were signiﬁcantly slower in the ﬁrst trial following
a penalty, calculated according to both methods (mean differ-
ence 86.6ms, SD 78.4ms, t -test: t 56 = 8.33, p< 0.001 for ﬁrst
method; 60.9ms, SD 79.8ms, t -test: t 56 = 5.75, p< 0.001 for
second method).
However, post-penalty slowing did not assist task performance,
since the degree of post-penalty slowing was negatively corre-
lated with mean reward per block (ρ=−0.422, p= 0.001 for ﬁrst
method; ρ=−0.324, p= 0.014 for second method), and mean
reward per rewarded trial (ρ=−0.468, p< 0.001 for ﬁrst method;
ρ=−0.362, p= 0.006 for second method). Thus the more sensi-
tive an individual was to a penalty by slowing down on the next
trial, the less overall reward they obtained.
We hypothesized that the degree to which participants adapt
their responses following a penalty might index performance
monitoring and the level of deliberation or control. Indeed, post-
penalty slowing was signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with UPPS
lack of premeditation (r2adj = 0.165, p= 0.003 for ﬁrst method;
r2adj = 0.100, p= 0.017 for second method). The extent of post-
penalty slowing was substantially lower (and in some cases absent)
in participants scoring highly on UPPS lack of premeditation.
Indeed, a greater degree of post-penalty slowing, which charac-
terizes more cautious, deliberative participants, is not functionally
adaptive to the task.
EFFECT OF AGE ON MODEL PARAMETERS
We hypothesized that if the Trafﬁc Light task indexes impul-
sive, opportunistic responding, then anticipatory responding
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FIGURE 4 | Observed and modeled response time distributions
partitioned by amber duration. Response time data (top and bottom left)
pooled across participants and partitioned by amber duration, shown with
respect to green onset (top) and amber onset (bottom). The proportion of
anticipations increases as amber duration increases. Importantly, our model
(top and bottom right) reproduces the observed increase in anticipatory
responses with increasing durations of amber: Penalized early responses tend
to be elicited on trials for which amber duration is longer than average.
should reduce with age, because aging is associated with reduced
risk-taking, and increased cautiousness (Deakin et al., 2004;
Dohmen et al., 2005). By contrast, if the effects of age are sim-
ply due to cognitive or sensorimotor slowing, we should instead
observe a relationship with reactive model parameters (reactive
rate of rise μr).
Our analysis revealed that the anticipatory rate of rise μa
was signiﬁcantly negatively associated with age (τ=−0.257,
p= 0.005), whereas μr was not associated with age (p> 0.1).
Moreover, the percentage of penalized trials showed a near-
signiﬁcant negative correlation with age (ρ=−0.263, p= 0.050).
In addition, mean reward per block correlated negatively with
age (ρ=−0.338, p= 0.011), as did mean reward per rewarded
trial (ρ=−0.323, p= 0.015). Thus functionally useful responding
declined with age. Participant age was unrelated to UPPS lack
of premeditation (p> 0.7). The observed relationship between
the mean rate of rise, μa of the modeled anticipatory decision
process andUPPS lack of premeditation remained signiﬁcant after
partialing out age (τ= 0.379, p= 0.010).
CONTRIBUTION OF TIME DURATION DISCRIMINATION
It was important to quantify the extent to which anticipatory
behavior on the Trafﬁc Light task is related simply to differences
in time duration discrimination. We found that variance in the
slope of the temporal duration discrimination stimulus-response
function (see Table 1) predicted a small proportion of variance
in Trafﬁc Light mean reward per block (r2adj = 0.059, p= 0.037;
addingmean biasmagnitude to themodel did not increase predic-
tive power), but there was no signiﬁcant relationship to modeled
anticipatory rate of rise (μa; p> 0.6) or frequency of penalized
early trials (p> 0.9).
This pattern of results is consistent with the view that tempo-
ral duration discrimination ability contributes to, but does not
entirely account for successful Trafﬁc Light task performance.
We would argue that an additional variable, such as individu-
ally varying impulsivity or motivation, contributes to anticipatory
responses in the task.
There was no relationship between the slope of the temporal
duration discrimination stimulus-response function and either
participant age (p> 0.3), or any self-report impulsivity subscale
(all p> 0.09). Thus, although performance on the Trafﬁc Light
task is sensitive to changes across age and self-reported impulsivity,
this cannot be accounted for by an effectmediated via discriminant
sensitivity to short durations of time.
LEARNING EFFECTS
We investigated effects across blocks, which could reﬂect learn-
ing, using repeated measures ANOVA (within-subjects factor: ﬁve
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blocks since a large minority (18%) of participants completed
5 blocks) with UPPS lack of premeditation, age, and temporal
duration discrimination slope as covariates.
Although in numerical terms performance improved across
blocks, the effect was not signiﬁcant: either for mean reward
per block, mean reward per rewarded trial or percentage penal-
ized trials (p> 0.1 for all). However, there was an interac-
tion between age and mean reward per block across blocks
(F4,176 = 2.602, p= 0.038). Contrasts revealed the effect was
quadratic (F1,44 = 2.634, p= 0.031; see Figure 5).
There was no evidence for an interaction between performance
across blocks and either UPPS lack of premeditation (for mean
reward per block, mean reward per rewarded trial, or simply
number of penalized trials: p> 0.1 for all) or temporal duration
discrimination slope (p> 0.1 for all). Therefore, the effect of UPPS
lack of premeditation reﬂects stable individual differences in strat-
egy present from the outset, i.e., willingness to take a risk and
anticipate green onset.
DISCUSSION
The current study investigated behavior in amanual“Trafﬁc Light”
task which requires participants to take risks under time pressure,
if they are to maximize reward. We argue that our task cap-
tures“functional impulsivity,”which is adaptive within the current
environment and balances the beneﬁts of careful premeditation
with those conferred by rapid, opportunistic responding (Dick-
man, 1990). Participants who responded in a more anticipatory
manner, and committed more penalties, also accumulated higher
mean reward. Anticipatory behavior on the Trafﬁc Light task was
related to a speciﬁc subscale on the UPPS Impulsive Behavior
FIGURE 5 | Mean reward per block across blocks. Mean reward per block
across blocks, shown by age quartiles in order to graphically illustrate the
quadratic effect of age and block number on mean reward per block. In
numerical terms performance improved across blocks, although the effect
was not signiﬁcant. Older participants showed steeper improvement in
performance than younger participants during early blocks.
Scale subscale labeled “lack of premeditation.” Participants with
high“lack of premeditation”scores behaved in amore anticipatory
manner, and accumulated higher mean reward.
ANTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR ON THE TRAFFIC LIGHT TASK
In the Trafﬁc Light paradigm, participants respond rapidly fol-
lowing onset of a green “go” signal, in order to obtain reward
(Figure 1). Reward value declines precipitously with response
speed from green onset, whereas responding during the preced-
ing amber signal incurs a small, ﬁxed penalty. Since the duration
of amber is variable, the onset of the green “go” signal cannot
be conﬁdently predicted. Moreover, since sensorimotor and deci-
sion delays are substantial, participants cannot attain the highest
rewards if they merely wait, and respond reactively to green onset.
Instead, participants should choose to sometimes risk incurring a
penalty, and initiate in advance an anticipatory response.
Our descriptive analysis suggested that many participants did
indeed adopt an anticipatory strategy on a proportion of trials.
This strategy could be labeled “functionally” impulsive (Dickman
andMeyer, 1988;Dickman, 1990), since participants who incurred
more penalties also accumulated higher reward. Moreover, antic-
ipation increased with increasing amber duration (Figure 4).
This suggests participants tailored their degree of anticipation to
the current trial environment. On average, participants incurred
penalties on 14% trials (Figure 3). For some individuals, this ﬁgure
was as high as 35%, whereas for others (particularly older partic-
ipants) it was close to zero. To better understand the mechanisms
underlying this variation, we modeled Trafﬁc Light RT distribu-
tions as arising probabilistically from two linear rise-to-threshold
processes (Adam et al., 2011).
In our model, trial RTs were assigned probabilistically to popu-
lations triggered by an anticipatory vs. a reactive decision process,
which on each trial compete in a “two-horse race” to response
threshold (Figure 2). The early, anticipatory process is triggered
before the green light by amber onset, and tends to result in either
penalized or highly rewarded responses. The later, reactive process
is triggered by green light onset, and tends to result in slower,more
modestly rewarded responses. Importantly, ourmodel reproduced
the observed increase in anticipatory responding with increasing
durations of amber (Figure 4).
Across participants, the modeled reactive decision process had
a rapid rate of rise from green onset and small variance, com-
mensurate with the unequivocal status of green onset as a signal
for immediate action. The reactive rise-to-threshold process thus
corresponded to a relatively narrow RT distribution with median
230ms after green onset. This value is in broad agreement with
RT estimates from previous studies that have studied simple reac-
tive responses to a go signal (Reddi and Carpenter, 2000; Taylor
et al., 2006). Importantly, our analyses suggest the reactive deci-
sion process is unaffected by individual differences in age and
self-reported impulsivity.
This was not the case for the anticipatory decision process.
Across participants, the anticipatory decision process had a slow
rate of rise from amber onset and large variance, commensurate
with the uncertain status of time elapsed during amber as a signal
for action. The corresponding amber RT distribution had a large,
late median and large variance. As predicted, the anticipatory
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decision process, and therefore the penalties and rewards to
which it contributed, was sensitive to a number of individual
difference variables: namely age, and speciﬁc dimensions of self-
reported impulsivity. We therefore suggest that it is the antici-
patory response component speciﬁcally that reﬂects “functional
impulsivity” in our task.
RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-REPORTED LACK OF PREMEDITATION
We observed an association between Trafﬁc Light anticipation
(anticipatory rate of rise; penalties; reward) and UPPS lack of pre-
meditation. This was replicated in the statistically related motor
impulsivity subscale of the BIS-11. More highly impulsive indi-
viduals (according to self-report) were more likely to make antic-
ipatory decisions, and in consequence they incurred more penal-
ties. Overall, however, these individuals accumulated higher mean
reward, since many of their responses occurred very brieﬂy after
green onset rather than just before it.
We argue that this tendency reﬂects a task-optimal, “function-
ally impulsive” mode of responding. High levels of UPPS lack of
premeditation were not associated with a large number of penal-
ties committed indiscriminately across durations of amber, but
rather were related to “functional” or well-judged early responses,
elicited when amber duration was longer than average. Note that
highly non-premeditative individuals (as indexed by UPPS lack of
premeditation scores) did not differ on reactive rate of rise (they
were not faster to respond to a go signal), and neither did they
show superior time perception.
The association between Trafﬁc Light anticipation variables
and UPPS lack of premeditation (and its statistical relation on
the BIS-11) suggests that the Trafﬁc Light task shows sensitivity
to a particular dimension of impulsivity. UPPS lack of premed-
itation encapsulates the tendency to act rapidly, without careful
forethought, and it has been argued that in certain contexts this is
adaptive (Dickman, 1990). Many existing behavioral measures of
impulsivity favor a careful, deliberative response strategy (Bechara
et al., 1994; Kirby andHerrnstein, 1995; Clark et al., 2006), and are
therefore not capable of measuring a rapid, functional aspect of
impulsivity. One potential exception is the Stop Signal task, which
indexes rapid motor responses and their withholding following a
stop signal (Chamberlain and Sahakian, 2007; Liddle et al., 2009).
Alternatively, it may be the case that UPPS lack of premeditation
reﬂects a general risk-seeking tendency. Comparison of Trafﬁc
Light with Iowa Gambling Task performance, and the relationship
to self-reported impulsivity, will reveal whether UPPS lack of pre-
meditation predicts rapid, accurately timed responses speciﬁcally,
or the propensity to take risks in order to accumulate rewardmore
generally. Indeed, if we are to fractionate distinct cognitive contri-
butions to impulsive behavior, it will be important to use a range
of experimental measures.
SENSITIVITY TO PENALTIES ON A TRIAL-TO-TRIAL BASIS
Participants were slower to respond in the trial immediately fol-
lowing a penalty. However, post-penalty slowing did not assist
performance, since it was negatively correlated with mean reward.
Individuals who were less “sensitive” to incurring a penalty – as
indexed by demonstrating a lesser degree of post-penalty slow-
ing – tended to accumulate more reward. In addition, the extent
of post-penalty slowing was substantially lower (and in some
cases absent) in participants scoring highly on UPPS lack of
premeditation, again underlying this important association with
performance on the task and one aspect of impulsivity.
EFFECTS OF AGE ON TRAFFIC LIGHT ANTICIPATION
Previous research has highlighted normative lifespan changes in
impulsivity, risk-seeking, and motivation (Deakin et al., 2004;
Dohmen et al., 2005; Steinberg et al., 2009; Brodaty et al., 2010).
Therefore, to the extent to which our Trafﬁc Light task indexes
impulsive, opportunistic responding, we expected to observe a
relationship with cross-sectional age. This prediction was upheld.
With increasing age, participants committed fewer penalized
early responses, showed a slower anticipatory mean rate of rise
and accumulated lower mean reward. Importantly, our mod-
eling analysis suggests that this was not due to sensorimotor
slowness per se. No effect of age was observed on the reactive
decision process (cf. reactive slowing; Cerella, 1985); the effect
was speciﬁc to the anticipatory decision process. Furthermore,
there was no relationship between age and performance on the
temporal duration discrimination task. Interpretation of this pat-
tern of ﬁndings within an established framework for decision-
making (Reddi and Carpenter, 2000) prompts the conclusion that
older participants show reduced urgency or motivation to pur-
sue risky, time-sensitive rewards (Ratcliff et al., 2000). This effect
may interact with learning effects across blocks (see Learning
Effects).
CONCLUSION
Impulsivity can be deﬁned as a predisposition to act with an inad-
equate degree of deliberation, forethought or control. However,
in certain contexts – such as when an opportunity is available
for a limited period of time – a degree of “functional” impulsivity
might actually be adaptive (Dickman, 1990). Here,we present data
from a Trafﬁc Light paradigm in which it is beneﬁcial to respond
in an “impulsive,” anticipatory manner. Participants scoring more
highly on a speciﬁc dimension of self-reported impulsivity (UPPS
lack of premeditation) show more anticipatory behavior and in
consequence, accumulate higher reward.
The Trafﬁc Light task could be applied in research investigat-
ing functional vs. dysfunctional impulsivity in healthy individuals,
including during pharmacological cognitive enhancement (Acad-
emy of Medical Sciences, 2008; Husain and Mehta, 2011). Our
ﬁndings show theutility of theTrafﬁcLight paradigm fordissociat-
ing the effects of individual differences in anticipatory responding
and certain forms of impulsivity from the effects of reactive slow-
ness per se. As such, our task may be valuable for testing impulsive
patients who also show psychomotor slowing (Voon and Dalley,
2011).
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